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FORMULATION OF POLICY FOR THE TREATMENT  
OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE REPRESENTATIVES ON DUTY IN  
IN THE UNITED STATES

(To be presented at Meeting of IAC Ad Hoc  
Committee, 12 April 1950)

DIA and DOS  
review(s)  
completed.

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### DISCUSSION

#### General:

2. During the past, both the Soviet Government and the Soviet Satellite Governments increasingly have imposed restrictions on the activities of U.S. official representatives on duty within those areas. The U.S. Embassy, Moscow (Reference 3) believes these actions stem from two allied but distinct factors:

a. The "historic Russian and Slav suspicion of foreign emissaries;" and,

b. "The avowed hostility toward the free world of the progressively resurgent imperialism of the present Soviet dictatorship."

Note: Corollary to this is the Soviet evaluation of their strengthened power position vis-a-vis the U.S.

3. Restrictions fall within two broad categories (Reference 3):

a. Security. The Soviet desire for secretiveness -- to minimize security risks -- results in an impact in relation to movement of officials, size of staffs, availability of information, etc.

b. Other. Housing, customs arrangements, etc., which are attributable to the immediate reaction of the atmosphere of animosity and gross Soviet inefficiency as well as the overall deep-seated conflict of interests.

#### Restrictions Imposed on U.S. Representatives in the USSR:

4. The treatment accorded U.S. representatives varies from country to country within the Soviet orbit; however, for purposes of illustration,

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Restrictions imposed on United States Air Attache personnel is herein outlined. (See Inclosure 1, "Restrictions Imposed on United States Air Attaches," U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 5 April 1949). Although this paper deals specifically with air attaches, it is much broader; it applies actually to practically all U.S. official representatives on duty in Moscow.

In general, varying degrees of restrictions are imposed, either officially or unofficially, in the following categories:

a. Travel

- (1) Restricted areas.
- (2) Procedural restrictions making travel very difficult.
- (3) Mode of travel restricted.

b. Activities

- (1) The use of cameras.
- (2) Entering public buildings.
- (3) Contact with Soviet citizens.

c. Invitations to official functions, and Soviet acceptance of U.S. invitations.

d. Contact with Soviet officials; for example in the case of the U.S. Air Attache, the Soviet Air Force Chief of Staff or any Soviet Air Force Officer.

e. Hiring of servants, labor, Embassy help, etc.

f. Posting of guards on Embassies and Legations, and many buildings housing foreigners or their activities.

g. Obtaining automobile driver permits.

h. Local airplane flights in the Moscow area.

i. Obtaining visas or laissez-passer's.

6. In connection with the above the Soviets employ the resources of a Foreign Aid Bureau (Burobin) designed specifically to deal with foreign nationals, particularly with respect to the handling of domestic problems, appointments, excepting military, etc.: Requests for travel are processed through Intourist, a parallel organization.

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\*These restrictions apply in theory to all foreign representatives; in practice, however, they apply primarily to the representatives of non-Communist states.

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7. It is recognized that a strictly reciprocal U.S. policy with reference to the above would be impracticable. This is particularly true with respect to extensive controls on the travel of foreign representatives. However, it is entirely possible within the existing U.S. Government framework to impose and enforce many important restrictions to curtail effectively the presently almost unlimited freedom of action which foreign representatives now enjoy in the United States.

8. H.J. Resolution 433, "To provide that the U.S. shall withhold from representatives of foreign nations' privileges which such nations withhold from representatives of the U.S." is considered timely; its possible enactment may increase the U.S. capability to implement a counter restrictive policy with more realism than would be possible, otherwise. The question of covering more adequately Soviet and Satellite personnel movements, and that of creating corresponding "bottlenecks" in the pursuit of normal day-to-day activities etc. will undoubtedly require additional U.S. manpower. In addition, overall policy coordination and implementation will require a central organization corresponding to the Soviet Foreign Aid Bureau, but broader in concept. In these instances where additional appropriations are indicated, passage of H.J. Resolution 433 would be of definite assistance.

U.S. Objectives to be Considered in Connection with a U.S. Policy vis-a-vis Soviet and Satellite Representatives:

9. The principal objectives that U.S. policy should attempt to achieve are:

- a. To better the U.S. strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviets.
- b. To increase U.S. prestige within the Soviet orbit and the non-Communist world in general.
- c. To alleviate living conditions for U.S. representatives on duty within the Soviet orbit.
- d. To reduce Soviet espionage capabilities.

Nature of U.S. Policy Consistent with U.S. Objectives:

10. The U.S. Embassy Moscow (Reference 3) believes that strict reciprocity, while possessing the advantage of possibly bettering living conditions of U.S. representatives, would magnify Soviet estimation of its own prestige and consequently harden the Soviet attitude as well as reduce the likelihood of the mission (Embassy) executing its observing activities. It is believed that this hypothesis is not born out by fact. Recognizing that there is little or no likelihood of the Soviets relaxing any restrictions wherein Soviet security is a paramount consideration,

experience proves that the Soviets are primarily respectful of power, and therefore that Soviet prestige vis-a-vis the U.S. would in all probability increase, whereas a vacillating or half-way U.S. policy would be less likely of obtaining any beneficial result. Therefore, in order to achieve any of the desired objectives, it is first believed that U.S. policy must be strong.

11. Whereas, the Soviets actually gain in reducing their security risks by many of the restrictions they impose upon U.S. representatives, there is little likelihood that any counter-action imposed against Soviet orbit representatives will accomplish much in this direction, even though Soviet Government activities within the U.S. play an important part in the Soviet intelligence system. The very nature of the U.S. Communist Party apparatus, with its far-reaching connections, as an instrument of Soviet power, insures a high degree of success in intelligence collection within the United States. Counter-action against Soviet orbit representatives can at best only hinder their overall activities within the U.S. Therefore, the reduction of security risks is believed to be a secondary consideration.

12. U.S. counter-action can assist implementation of U.S. strategy indirectly by communicating to the Kremlin that we mean business. Again a firm policy will be most likely to succeed in this respect.

13. Within the above framework, it is believed that U.S. policy should restrict movement to all places of military importance, restrict mission staffs to the same size as those permitted in the case of the U.S. in the Soviet Union, control personnel movements within practicable limits, impose a maximum number of nuisance restrictions in all matters pertaining to daily living activities, customs, visas, etc. U.S. policy vis-a-vis Soviet satellite representatives on duty within the U.S. should follow in general that applying to the USSR, but designed to meet particular situations wherein satellite policy may be in variation to that of the USSR, more lenient when applicable, etc.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

14. In view of the above, and in consideration of possible favorable action on H.J. Resolution 433, it is recommended:

a. That the United States adopt a reciprocal code which will apply in theory to all foreign official representatives; in practice, however, only to Soviet orbit representatives on duty in the United States. (See Tab "A" for recommended code).

b. That in connection with the paragraph above, an organization comparable to the Soviet Visitors Bureau be established for the purpose of monitoring and coordinating all housekeeping problems of said Soviet orbit representatives.

c. That violation of the reference code on the part of any Soviet orbit representative will be sufficient reason for requesting their recall.

d. That the FBI instigate a sufficiently adequate "spot check" system to induce a feeling in Soviet orbit representatives that they are being watched.

TAB "A"

CODE OF RESTRICTIONS FOR SOVIET ORBIT REPRESENTATIVES

1. In so far as is practicable, to apply restrictions on a "quid pro quo" basis to the representatives in the U. S. of each individual state included within the Soviet Orbit. In no case are these restrictions to be more stringent than those applying to U. S. representatives within each respective state.

2. Implementation of the following restrictions is considered to require no additional expenditure of manpower or funds:

a. Size of diplomatic mission. A mission's staff to be limited in size to that of the U. S. mission tolerated in each respective Soviet Orbit state.

b. Tax-free imports. A limit, expressed in dollar value, to be placed on the total quantity of tax-free imports which a mission may bring into the U. S. for the purpose of operating such missions. Such imports to include:

(1) All items of office furniture, fixtures, household furniture, and appliances, such as typewriters, notebooks, papers, pencils, etc.

(2) All household goods, including items of food, furniture, beverages, etc.

(3) Motor transport and related items.

Any and all items over and above such limit imported into the U. S. by a mission to be taxable according to the laws of the U. S.

c. Customs inspection. "Laissez-passers" to be required for all travel outside the continental U. S. Failure to present such "laissez-passers" to the customs officials at the border to entail a close inspection by customs officials of the personal baggage and belongings of the diplomatic representatives. The personal baggage and belongings of wives and/or dependents of diplomatic representatives, when not accompanied by the respective accredited diplomatic personnel, to be inspected by customs officials, even when the individual is in possession of a diplomatic passport. (See paragraph 3a, (1) (b) below.)

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3. Implementation of the following restrictions will require a nominal additional expenditure of manpower and funds:

a. Special Agency or Bureau. A special agency or bureau to be created for the purpose of processing the requests by representatives of a foreign nation in the U. S., and to ensure compliance with regulations.

(1) Travel.

(a) Travel without permits. Travel without permits to be limited to a radius of 30 miles of the District of Columbia.

(b) Travel with permits.

1. Travel outside the above area to be performed only upon special permission by the Bureau. Requests for such permission to be processed through the Bureau and to be submitted one week in advance. Date, time, and duration of travel, including a complete itinerary, purpose of the travel, and full name (s) of person (s) performing travel to be submitted together with the request. Travel outside the area indicated to be performed by common carrier only.

2. Requests for "laissez-passers" for travel outside continental U. S. to be issued by the Bureau. (See paragraph 2, c, above.)

(2) Requests for housing, utility services, etc. All Soviet Orbit representatives to be required to obtain all housing, maintenance and repairs, furniture, servant help, hotel accommodations, telephone service, garage facilities, etc., through the special agency or bureau listed above by special written requests in each individual case, with an explanation of the reasons therefor submitted with the requests.

(3) Miscellaneous activities.

(a) The use or carrying of cameras and binoculars by diplomatic representatives not to be specifically forbidden, but any time such representatives are seen with one, the camera and/or binocular to be confiscated by an officer of the law. Depending upon circumstances, the cameras or binoculars may or may not be returned.

(b) Certain government and public buildings, determined by the State Department, to be placed off limits, except when proper application is made in writing by diplomatic representatives for admission.

(c) Invitations for representatives of Soviet Orbit countries to attend military or social functions to be restricted to approximately four (4) major parades or receptions per year. No invitations are to be extended to inspect any military or naval installation or equipment. On any visit, representatives are to be accompanied by appropriately designated officers or civilian agents who understand the Russian language. Attendance at Russian social functions to be limited to certain limited specified U. S. personnel.

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Control 3801

Rec'd January 21, 1950  
5:53 p.m.

FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 219, January 21, 5 p.m.

Embassy has given most careful consideration to request contained DEPTEL 8, January 5 for views and recommendations regarding reciprocal restrictive treatment Soviet bloc officials.

Seems to us that problem, and consequent possibilities obtaining principal objective of ameliorating current conditions or deterring imposition further restrictions (particularly in the satellites, China, etc.) by resort to reciprocal sanctions, involves assessment fundamental Soviet concept diplomatic relations between East and West under existing or evolving circumstances. Bearing in mind historic Russian and Slavic suspicion foreign emissaries to which is ~~not~~ added the avowed hostility toward the free world of the progressively resurgent imperialism of the present Soviet dictatorship, obtention in the USSR of general operating conditions for foreign representatives comparable to accepted international free world standards looms as a major undertaking. A measure of the depth of Soviet opposition to be overcome may be reflected in Vishinsky's remarks at last GA taking pride in fact that Soviet secretiveness had materially confused Hitlerite military planning. Principal impact this attitude on diplomatic missions is felt in relation to movements officials, size staffs, availability information, etc., where Soviets see security risks. Less essential in eyes Soviets to containment mission activities probably are such matters as housing, customs arrangements, etc., where situation now doubtless attributable as much to immediate reaction atmosphere animosity and gross Soviet inefficiency as to deep-seated estimate conflict of interests.

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Essential magnitude of problem based our appraisal its engrained origins does not, however, in our view suggest that it should not be faced nor that under given circumstances some alleviation of restrictions now in force might be obtained or at least the imposition of additional ones deterred by reprisal. Broadest approach might be effort to convolve within UN framework international body to formulate comprehensive code to govern rights and immunities diplomatic and consular officials, and it is submitted that recent developments in China would appear likely to make free world peoples particularly receptive such project this time. On level direct reprisal, believe maximum achievable in all probability might be improvement living conditions mission personnel with appreciably less likelihood alteration for better of possibilities for execution mission's observational activities.

With regard to nature and method application reprisals, if instituted, presumably imposition of restrictions reciprocally comparable in all respects to those in effect in Soviet bloc would necessitate legislation. It can be argued that the submission of request for broad legislative authority to be exercised at the President's discretion would have the advantage of placing the issue squarely before the country and obtaining Congressional support for funds to implement restrictive program. On the other hand, from standpoint effect on Soviets, Embassy inclines feel appearance such action as major policy determination likely magnify Soviet estimate extent engagement its prestige and consequently harden Soviet attitude. On balance, therefore, Embassy believes that at outset effort should be made confine counter measures to those matters concerning which administrative action can be taken with minimum official publicity but with maximum practical effect.

View divergencies between treatment various respects several satellitas Embassy does not believe uniform counter measures on Soviet bloc basis can be contemplated but that counter restrictions should be applied reciprocally light measures in force USSR and each satellite separately. At same time seems desirable consult other free nations with view their taking parallel counteraction were their missions similarly restricted.

As regards Soviet Union under present conditions, counter-restrictions on (1) housing, if feasible, (possibly through requesting Soviet Embassy personnel to reside in D.C.) and (2) free customs entry, and (3) the imposition of exit visa requirements, would seem have best chance achieve ameliorative effect. Counter measures (1) as to travel outside D.C. and (2) denying automobile drivers licenses to Soviet officials might deter further restrictions here. In taking measures this nature believe should be made clear orally to Soviets that action predicated uncooperative attitude by Soviets in providing housing Moscow

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(d) Representatives of the Soviet Orbit countries to be denied access to social contact with service personnel except when approved by the Department of National Defense.

(e) Drivers' licenses to be restricted only to those representatives who can pass a rigid driving test by special examiners. Applicants to be failed in proportion to those U. S. Embassy personnel who are failed in Moscow.

(f) U. S. uniformed guards to be placed at street entrances to offices and living quarters of the Soviet Orbit countries for the purpose of observing and recording all movements.

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(have obtained no additional housing since 1945, six additional apartments have been promised for year and half) and willingness remove as soon as appropriate Soviet remedial steps taken. As to customs, Department aware quota system now in effect USSR. Presume we would have to determine in advance whether Soviet Embassy imports US exceed our customs duty quota level here which amounts about \$150,000 annually.

Perhaps desirable conclude note caution. Department will, of course, appreciate that, with Soviet regime currently feeling its oats, impossible entirely exclude danger that imposition any direct countermeasures could result additional restrictions here seriously compromising present marginal operation Embassy.

Whatever decision urge that prior to initiation of any contemplated direct action, proposed measures be communicated Embassy for study and further recommendation.

Service attaches generally concur this telegram, although would stress desirability institution this time such countermeasures as are determined to be feasible and appropriate, and request pass defense.

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**EXTRACTS OF LETTER AD-35-49, FROM OFFICE OF THE AIR**

**ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW, USSR,**

**5 April 1949, TO DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE,**

**USAF**

**SUBJECT: Restrictions Imposed on United States Air Attaches**

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**1. Restrictions in Moscow and vicinity.**

**a. Travel.**

- (1) There are no travel restrictions within the city limits of Moscow. However, over 70% of the time the Air Attaches have observed that they are followed by Soviet agents by automobile or on foot.
- (2) Travel is permitted within a fifty (50) kilometer radius of Moscow with restrictions as noted in inclosures No. 1, 2 and 3. Travel is permitted through restricted raions in commercial type vehicles but not in private cars. Stopovers are not allowed at any time. (see shaded areas in inclosure No. 1)

**b. Activities.**

- (1) Although our Embassy has received no formal notification that the use of cameras and binoculars is forbidden, yet it is considered hazardous to use them in view of past experience. Foreigners who have openly carried cameras in the USSR have had them taken away and the film exposed and sometimes the cameras were not returned. On 23 February 1948, Mr. George P. Winters, Jr., State Department Attache here, was taken into custody by Militiamen for taking harmless photographs and held for four or five hours for questioning and finally released after some intimidation and efforts to get him to sign damaging statements saying he was photographing a factory.

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One foreign Military Attache was detained by Soviet Militiamen for several hours for using binoculars and accused of taking pictures of Moscow factories. Thereafter he was constantly followed, at times by as many as five or six automobiles. He was made the subject of numerous newspaper articles describing him as one of the most dangerous of foreign spies. The net result was that the Attache had to be recalled for his usefulness had been greatly impaired by the manner in which he was treated by the Soviets following the episode.

- (2) Foreigners may not enter public buildings except, of course, restaurants, hotels, etc., without having an appointment or some special business with someone in the building in question, otherwise they will not be permitted beyond the guard which one usually finds at entrances of such places. Normally, in order to secure such an appointment, one must make request through the Soviet Foreign Office. (See inclosure No. 4)
- (3) Contact with Soviet citizens is made extremely difficult since they are continually being warned not to associate with foreigners. Not only are they warned, but frequently severely admonished and some times arrested when contacts with nationals of western powers are kept up.
  - (a) Only one member of this Embassy has, at present, a library card to a Soviet library. This was acquired only after answering a long questionnaire on why he wanted admittance, (i.e. to write a Phd. thesis), what subject he was interested in, why, and what books he would need. Even then he is not permitted to see card files and must ask for each book wanted by name in advance. None of our Attaches have applied for one recently, so it may be possible to secure one under the limitations listed above.
- (4) The only invitations extended to Attaches by the Soviets in the past year were:
  - (a) May Day Parade.
  - (b) November 7th Parade and Molotov Reception that followed.
  - (c) Red Army Day Reception.
  - (d) July Air Show.

-At the parades all US Attaches were surrounded by plain clothes men and English speaking Soviet

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officers. The plain clothes agents made it a point to be at the very elbow of the man assigned to them.

-No close-up inspection of any equipment was permitted.

-At the reception, no Russians were permitted to talk to our officers for more than limited greeting. Soviet officers stood around against the walls talking only among themselves and made no effort to initiate any greetings. When any seemingly violated this restriction by standing with Westerners for even a few minutes they were quickly interrupted and led away by OVS personnel or told in Russian that "it is forbidden to talk with foreigners."

- (5) With one exception, all social invitations extended by our Air Attaches to the Soviets and/or satellite Attaches have been refused, ignored, or if accepted, they would call up at the last moment with an excuse for not coming or just fail to come at all. The one exception occurred when the undersigned held a special reception for all Attaches in the Diplomatic Colony. Only three OVS officers accepted this invitation - no Soviet Air Force officers came. Two or three OVS officers attend major social functions quite regularly, when invited, always the same few individuals.
- (6) Repeated requests have been made over a period of six (6) months by the undersigned to the Soviet Foreign Office for appointments to meet the Soviet Air Force Chief of Staff and other Air Force Officers. All of these requests have been ignored. To date, the undersigned has not met any Soviet Air Officers.

2. Restrictions outside vicinity of Moscow.

a. Travel.

- (1) See inclosures 5 and 6 for those areas where it is forbidden to visit. Note that not only are there large areas where foreigners may not visit, but also certain isolated areas and cities. Foreigners are not permitted to visit shores of the Black Sea except Odessa nor Soviet border areas.
- (2) Prior to going on any trip outside the fifty (50) kilometer radius, procedure outlined in inclosure No. 6 (a Soviet requirement), must be followed.

- (3) When travelling outside the USSR from Moscow, by train, it is necessary to pay for tickets three (3) days ahead of time. Then, if you fail to use the ticket for any reason, there is a substantial charge made - even if the reason was that the Soviets held up your visa. Train tickets will not be sold to anyone unless they have a proper visa in their passports.
- (4) Often one is met on an incoming train by an Intourist agent which service one must pay for even though such service was not requested, needed nor desired. Any taxi, bus, etc. that the Intourist agent secures for the traveller usually costs about twice the usual amount. Porters secured by the Intourist charge ten (10) rubles for heavy bags, and, once in a while, five (5) rubles for a light one. This represents several times the cost in the United States. Many separate moves of baggage may be forced upon the foreigner with separate charges for each move. The following example is cited for your information.
- On a recent trip from Helsinki to Moscow, the Air Attache brought in several pieces of hand baggage. Intourist personnel in Leningrad insisted upon handling the baggage in the following manner:
- On arrival in Leningrad in one station the bags were transferred from train to auto at ten (10) rubles per bag. They insisted on going to a hotel instead of directly to the other station, where the Air Attache would later go aboard the Moscow bound train, and charged ten (10) rubles per bag to move the luggage into the hotel. Several hours storage charges in the hotel amounted to five (5) rubles per bag. Another ten (10) rubles charge per bag was made to take them from the hotel to the auto and still another ten (10) rubles per bag from the automobile to the Moscow train. Attempts were made by the Attache and the courier who was accompanying him to have this luggage moved directly from one station to the other and checked at that point. Intourist insisted that this could not be done although there are check rooms for this purpose in both of these stations.
- (5) Frequently, we purchase a ticket from one point to another with an interim stop. In this case, the traveller is given a slip of paper which he may exchange for the ticket necessary for the second leg of the journey. There is a charge of several rubles for this exchange.



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- (6) On all trips, as well as in the Moscow area, foreign military travellers are closely followed or accompanied in the same compartment by Soviet agents. Soviet citizens are continually diverted from contacting US personnel, often with little visible effort to hide the action.

**3. General.**

a. All hiring of servants, labor, musicians, etc. must be done through a Soviet Agency called Burobin. All maintenance and repair materials for buildings, appliances and for automobiles must be secured through that agency.

- (1) This serves as a real handicap to US personnel for servants can be forbidden to work any longer for the US personnel by Burobin at any time; at other times these servants may even stop work themselves. When this happens there is often a real problem involved in procuring a replacement - not because of a shortage of Russians who would like to work for Americans, but because they are not permitted to work unless they are acceptable to the Foreign Office. Obviously, such servants must be politically secure and agree to act as Soviet agents before they are permitted to work for foreigners. A considerable amount of time and work is lost in the securing and training of new servants.

b. All Embassies and Legations, and many buildings housing foreigners or their activities have Soviet Militiamen posted at all street entrances 24 hours a day. These can and do prevent unrecognized Soviet citizens from entering.

c. Drivers licenses for private or government owned vehicles are made almost impossible to secure. Only three or four people in the US Embassy have been able to secure them to date. It is believed that now none of the Armed Service Attaches would be given one under any circumstance. It is a well known fact that all accidents involving foreigners and Soviet citizens almost invariably cost the foreigner large amounts of money regardless as to who was to blame for the accident. The employment of Soviet Chauffeurs also must have the approval of Burobin with the usual delays. It is known that all chauffeurs report the activities and movements of the foreign personnel who employ them to the police. On local trips by automobile, they work very closely with the Soviet agents who trail Embassy cars in order that the trailer will not lose contact.

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d. Local airplane flights in the vicinity of Moscow are not available to foreigners. Except for infrequent arrivals of the Ambassadors aircraft, or on regularly scheduled Soviet Passenger planes, no foreigners are allowed to fly in the Soviet Union.

e. Visa and laissez-passer requests must be applied for about ten days ahead of time and are received, usually only a few hours before departure time. This leaves the foreigner in doubt until the last minute as to whether the trip had been approved. Frequently, the requested visas and laissez-passers are not received until too late to leave at the time planned.

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